Romans 9:15

15. For The two fors in this and the seventeenth verse show that Paul gives a reason in each case for maintaining God’s rectitude; first for the bright side, and next for the dark side of the divine dealings in his system of free-agency.

The predestinarian view makes Paul’s answer to the question, Is God unrighteous? be simply this: God is an absolute sovereign, and can do as he pleases, and will as he will, and therefore what he does is right. He can choose men to sin and death “for nothing in them,” and for no fault of theirs; and, because He is almighty, it is right. But,

1. Such a reply is not Pauline, as we have shown, (see note on Romans 3:4-5.) Paul’s doctrine is not that a thing is right because the Absolute One does it; but the Absolute does that which is intrinsically right.

2. The supposed answer is no answer at all. When I ask, Is a given act right? it is no reply to say the actor could do what he pleased, and could will as he willed, and therefore it was right. Power increased infinitely cannot change right. A creature can be supposably wronged by even an infinite being.

3. The predestinarian interpretation makes Paul pretend to give a reason, but really resort to force, and seek to frighten his opponent out of reasoning. Now even if thus silencing instead of convincing were not very mean, the pretending to give a reason when he gives no reason at all would be very mendacious.

4. Mr. Barnes (on Romans 9:15) argues that where all are guilty and worthy of death an executive may pardon a definite number without any just complaint from the unpardoned. Not, we reply, where his own previous decree has plunged the unpardoned into the sin and misery for which he condemns them.

5. Mr. Barnes argues that to predestinate unconditionally a man to sin and damnation is no more unjust than to make him inferior to his fellow “in regard to talents, health, beauty, prosperity, and rank.” It is just as right for God to make me a sinner, and send me to hell for being what he has decretively made me, as it is for him to make me less than a Solomon. (See his notes on Romans 9:12; Romans 9:21.) But,

( 1.) These temporal inferiorities are compensated by a large surplus of happiness that renders life desirable in spite of them; but for eternal damnation there is no compensation. Defenders of God’s benevolence, like Paley, point us to the great surplus of happiness over misery diffused by God among all living beings. Life itself is a happiness; and its cessation, death, is dreaded and avoided as the greatest of evils. Thus do all living beings, however inferior, consent, agree, and covenant with God gladly to accept life as long as he will graciously bestow it upon them. But who ever consents to be brought into existence a necessary sinner just as necessarily as a sparrow is not an eagle, or a zany is not a sage and for that necessity be sent to an eternal hell?

(2.) These varieties of rank and advantage, of superiority and inferiority, are necessary to a grand system of creation. The result is that, while there is disadvantage in the various parts, the highest advantage is attained for the whole, and such a degree of happiness is secured for every part as that part is glad to accept. But to produce one class of beings upon whom sin and damnation are resistlessly fixed ages before they are born, predetermining their wills to sin, and their souls to hell for that sin, is an awful crime to charge upon God. It is only when by wilful, persistent, undecreed, and unnecessary sin, a free agent violates the divine order, and thus deserves eternal expulsion and reprobation, that such a destiny can be justifiable.

(3.) Omnipotently to create an innocent being supremely miserable would be an act of unspeakable despotism; but there may be discerned in it a certain infernal frankness and magnanimity. But to take an innocent nature, such as man is before he is decreed a sinner, and decretively smear sin upon him as a ground of justly damning him to an eternal hell, is as mean and mendacious as it is despotic. The calling such dealings righteousness, justice, is what our moral nature, with all its intensity, pronounces a truly execrable falsity.

(4.) We offer no solution to the problem that amiable and clear intellects, like Albert Barnes, can not only advocate doctrines which are morally so abominable, but can advocate them with reasonings so futile. But we are almost compelled to believe, from such specimens of logic, that the divine penalty imposed upon the ablest intellects for holding the abhorrent dogma, is to be smitten with collapse in defending it.

Saith unto Moses (Exodus 33:19.) Moses coming down from Sinai, where he had received the law, finding the people immersed in idolatry, exclaims, Who is on Jehovah’s side? Forthwith the tribe of Levi step forth, draw swords, and execute upon the spot three thousand transgressors.

Next day (Exodus 22:22) Moses prays that if Jehovah will not spare the people, his own name may be blotted out from God’s book. Jehovah respects the profound unselfishness of the mistaken prayer, but sternly replies,” Whosoever hath sinned against me, HIM will I blot out of my book.” Such was the conditional rule and reason of the Divine will in inflicting wrath, (Exodus 32:15-33.) And this explains the dark side of the antithesis in Romans 9:18.

Moses again stands to intercede with God, (xxxiii, 12-19,) and, meeting a gracious reception, beseeches God, Show me thy glory. God consents, declaring, (the words quoted by Paul,) “I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious,” etc. And this explains the bright side of the antithesis in Romans 9:18.

God thus willed, in spite of Moses’ wish, to punish the guilty, and THE GUILTY ONLY; and he willed, in accordance with Moses’ wish, to show him his glory. Thus did God will as he was supremely pleased to will. Yet let four things be noted: First, this willing as he will does not mean willing without a reason, motive, or rule, but willing with a perfect right, reason, motive, and rule. Second. It does not mean that the reason, motive, or rule is an incomprehensible, mysterious, unrevealed, unknown one, but the fully revealed and perfectly just rule of impartially dealing with men as free agents. Third. The peremptoriness of this willing as he will, while it does not exclude either reason, rule, or a publication of reason or rule, does override the small caprice of the man who (as Moses) would doubt, cavil, or rebel against the infinite reason; and, Fourth, This willing as he will is a willing to deal with men, not “for nothing in them,” but according to their faith, and subsequently to their faith, and conditionally upon their faith. The wrongly praying Moses is the type of the weeping Paul, or even of the cavilling Jew, humanely wishing that God would spare the unfaithful people; yet God will inflexibly act on the known and universally published rules of righteous judgment. He will disregard human dictation, whether in form of prayer, weeping, or cavil, and so will have mercy on whom he will have mercy. And human reason, being finitely in the type of divine reason, when it comes to an understanding of the divine rules and reasons, does in its highest exertions profoundly approve the principles on which they are based. So that Paul’s logic is a full reply to his Jewish opponent.

In this interpretation we make no mistake. We have rightly interpreted God’s words to Moses as they are in the Old Testament. And on the perfectly just rule that, where possible, a quotation in the New from the Old Testament must be taken in its original sense, the passage means from the pen of Paul just what it means from the mouth of Jehovah.

Alford makes the apostle here teach “Divine sovereignty” solely and regardless of human freedom, (freedom, he says, is fully taught in other places,) from Paul’s habit of “insulating the one subject under consideration.” But, 1. Alford entirely mistakes the “subject” which the apostle here “insulates.” “Divine sovereignty” is not the “subject,” nor the question, in any part of the chapter. It is God’s “ unrighteousness,” (Romans 9:14, as there said in our note,) namely, Has not God the right, overruling the Jews, to sink the old narrow Judaic particularism in a new broad conditional universality? Has not God the right to do right? And, 2, Alford’s exposition not only makes the apostle leave human freedom out of view, but forces it out of existence by completely contradicting it, and making any assertion of freedom elsewhere to be false. 3. Alford forgets that in this very chapter the apostle takes care to assert human freedom, and so to assert it as to run it through all these instances, and so deny the absolutist interpretation in each and every case. (See notes on 30-33.)

I will… on whom I will This simple assertion, that God will accept whom he pleases, decides not the question, Whom does he please or will to accept? But, taken in its connexions, it plainly means that whereas the Jew wills that God should accept all Jews, God wills and will do as he wills to accept all true believers. Paul thus peremptorily asserts not the divine Will in disregard of reason, or in disregard of “anything in the individual,” or in regard to some unknown reason, or in absolute “divine sovereignty” over all things, but in entire independence of Jewish pedigree, merit, or dictation. The Jew prefers a system of predestinated birth-salvation; God prefers an equalized system of free-agency and will have his way. He will have his way in spite of the cavils of predestinarians, whether Judaistic or Calvinistic.

The rules by which God thus wills, and absolutely pleases, to have mercy, are abundantly revealed in Scripture. To reveal and publish them is, indeed, the great object of Scripture. The decalogue proclaims him a God “showing mercy to thousands that love me and keep my commandments.” “Let the wicked forsake his way, and return to the Lord, and he will have mercy. (Isaiah 55:7.) The pretence, therefore, that this verse presupposes some no-reason, or some unknowable reason, for his gracious preferences, is a figment and a folly.